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INTRODUCTION
True reform necessarily entails new law. In the newly independent Russian
Federation, law has played a formative role in efforts to reform the health care system.
Both historically and structurally, the health care system in Russia is more dependent on
legal authorization than that in most Western industrialized countries. Reforms that
providers might institute independently elsewhere are not likely to happen in Russia
without specific laws authorizing them. Policy makers often formulate the substance of
policy in the context of developing legislation, instead of drafting legislation to codify
settled policy decisions. Thus, identifying and developing suitable laws has become an
essential component of health care reform in Russia since the early 1990’s.
The promise and peril of Russian health reform centers around its constitutional
guarantee of free health care, contained in the Constitution of the Russian Federation:1
“Everyone shall have the right to health care and medical assistance.
Medical assistance shall be made available by state and municipal health
care institutions to citizens free of charge, with the money from the
relevant budget, insurance payments and other revenues.”
Russian health reform held promise because Russian health policy makers remained
committed to the principle of solidarity—universal access to health care for the entire
population. The peril arose from urgent needs for care from a health care system that no
longer had either the money or the infrastructure to provide it.
In the 1990’s, most European countries struggled to control the cost of health care
while preserving health care as a social good based on the moral principle of social
solidarity.2,3 But they did so largely in response to increasing pressure on reasonably well
functioning health care systems.2,4 Aging populations with more medical needs,
expanding use of new and expensive technologies, and tighter national budgets led
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Western European governments to seek new ways to reduce the cost of care.5,6,7,8,9,10,11
Russia, in contrast, did not have the comparative luxury of planning for a more expensive
future. As described in the first section below, Russia faced mounting pressure for
reform to save its health care system.
The need for reform created an acute need for new law. The role of law in
Russian health reform is summarized in the second section. The third section describes
four subjects of legal reform in Russia, as well as limitations on the effectiveness of law
to achieve health goals. Paradoxically, although new laws cannot guarantee health to the
Russian population, Russia may need even more new laws to enable it to honor its
constitutional guarantee.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR HEALTH REFORM IN RUSSIA
The Russian Federation inherited the administration and Russian facilities of the
Soviet health care system.12 In the Soviet system, the national, oblast (state) and local
governments received revenues and taxes from government-owned industries and
allocated budget funds to the health care system to pay facilities and providers.13 Like
its Soviet predecessor, the Russian Federation guaranteed medical care to all its citizens.
The federal government continued to assume ultimate responsibility for providing its
citizens health care, delegating to oblast and local governments the task of actual service
provision. Oblast and local governments use their own tax revenues, together with a
diminishing federal budget allocation, to operate their own hospitals, polyclinics, and
specialized service centers where the general population is entitled to receive all types of
medical care. The federal government operates certain specialized national health
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facilities and clinics. Physicians are salaried and employed by the various levels of
government to provide services in all these facilities. Thus, there is a longstanding
network of facilities, staff, and services built decades ago on the solidarity principle.
Beginning in the mid 1960’s, the Soviet government funded its health care budget
only with the meager revenues left over after paying for an expensive military build-up
and other higher priority commitments.14 The dwindling funds became a trickle after the
Soviet Union was disbanded. The Russian Federation retained the largest population,
richest natural resources, and best-developed industries of the new Commonwealth of
Independent States, but its economy no longer produced sufficient revenues to pay for
essential government programs. The federal government began to denationalize
industries in the mid 1990’s. It transferred the revenue-producing enterprises (oil, natural
gas, nickel, banking, media) to private ownership, often at prices representing a tiny
fraction of their value, leaving the government with a tenuous commitment to private
enterprise but few resources to fund its continuing social obligations.15 The oligarchs,
many of whom obtained ownership shareholdings in formerly state-owned enterprises in
the scandalous 1994 loans-for-shares program, helped maintain the Yeltsin administration
in power but returned little in taxes to the depleted federal, oblast or municipal budgets.16
When Russia’s economy collapsed and the ruble was devalued in 1998, the health
care system had suffered decades of neglect. The Russian population was experiencing
rising morbidity and mortality rates that demanded immediate attention with modern
prevention and treatment. Although Russians’ health status had been decreasing since
the mid-1980s, its even more precipitous decline in the 1990’s has been well
documented. 17,18,19 Between 1990 and 1994, life expectancy fell from 63.8 to 57.5 for
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men and from 74.4 to 71.2 for women, an unprecedented drop for a country not at war.20
Although life expectancy increased significantly after 1994, improvement halted again in
1998.21 With a population of about 146 million, Russia has negative population growth,18
and within this decade could fall to a smaller population than Russia had before the 1917
revolution. Rising mortality from cardiovascular diseases and injuries (including
homicide and suicide) accounted for more than 64% of deaths.22 The incidence of
infectious diseases—especially tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS,
and diphtheria—grew faster than the public health system could respond.23,24,25,26,27,28
Illicit drug use began to rise.29 Alcohol consumption, traditionally high in Russia,
became increasingly dangerous when cheap impure vodka offered the only solace
available to many Russians who had lost their jobs, their homes, or their sense of
security.30,31,32 Falling levels of nutrition, industrial pollution, rising crime, and
increasing numbers of homeless all contributed to an assault on the health of Russians.33
Although health indicators improved slightly in the mid-1990’s, the health care
system has been unable to respond adequately to such an onslaught of disease. Hospitals
had little money for new equipment or even routine maintenance; physicians and other
health workers often relied on under-the-table payments to supplement their low salaries,
which government sometimes delayed paying; and modern drugs and services ordinarily
provided by the government were generally unavailable or unaffordable.34,35,36 The
health care system could not keep pace with technology or standards of care that were the
norm in the industrialized West—for lack of access to medical information or funds.
Formal government health care expenditures were 4.8% of GDP in 1994. By 1998, they
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had dropped to about 3.2% (including federal mandatory health insurance) of GDP,
among the lowest in Europe, which averaged about 8% of GDP.17
With a crumbling health care infrastructure and insufficient government funds to
pay for improvements, Russia could not provide adequate care to the population by
simply continuing its government controlled system. One way to supplement funds for
health care was to permit private financing of some medical services.37 The World Bank
and International Monetary Fund, as well as some Western economists, had urged
reducing the entire federal budget and encouraged introducing some market reforms into
the health system.38,39
Fear of commercialization, however, made recourse to private financing anathema
to the Ministry of Health (MinZdrav), most Members of Parliament, and many local
health authorities and health professionals. Russia’s economic collapse had left health
professionals profoundly skeptical of bringing private ownership and market competition
into the health care system. From their perspective, the introduction of capitalism had
thrown the country’s economy into chaos, deprived the elderly of their pensions—often
their only means of support, thrown millions of formerly secure workers into the street
with no prospect of remunerative employment, and allowed a small band of oligarchs to
spirit the country’s assets away into Swiss bank accounts. Few in the health field were
willing to risk a similar looting of their hospitals and polyclinics. It appeared that
Russia’s health care system was backed into a corner. Yet, almost everyone recognized
that the status quo could not continue and, in the absence of new federal funding, policy
makers accepted the need for reform in almost every sector of the health system. 40
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THE ROLE OF LAW IN HEALTH REFORM
Although law had little to do with the need for reform, Russia has given law a far
larger role in reform than have most European countries. Why is law so important in
Russia?
ONLY WHAT IS AUTHORIZED IS PERMITTED

In most Western democracies, the first principle of the legal system is that
anything is permitted unless the law expressly forbids it. Its first corollary is that nothing
is required unless the law specifically requires it. Historically, Russia has operated on the
opposite principle: nothing is permitted unless the law expressly authorizes it.
The presumption that nothing is permitted unless the law authorizes it obviously
inhibits spontaneous reform by private parties. Without explicit legal authority, anyone
who initiates a new program might be accused of violating the law. This does not mean
that Russia has no illegal or extra-legal activity. On the contrary, there are elaborate
networks of black markets and underground activities, including under-the-table
payments to physicians for medical care. But most such activities remain clandestine
because they are recognized as illegal or at least of questionable legality and kept hidden
from government view.41
Russia remains steeped in a Soviet civil law tradition that entails extensive
legislation.42 The codification of so much business and personal activity leaves little
room for creative lawyering, such as that practiced in the West. Lawyers rarely try to
interpret ambiguous laws to permit doing something new.43 Indeed, most lawyers still
work for government agencies. The number of lawyers engaged in private practice,
especially to represent private individuals, has only recently begun to expand.44 Thus,
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physicians and others who propose new forms of practice or administrators who propose
new financing mechanisms are not likely to test their ideas without seeking specific new
authorizing legislation or orders. This means that new laws must be developed to define
and regulate reform measures before significant change occurs.
FREEDOM ENTAILS MORE LAW THAN DOES TYRANNY

The paradox of social regulation is that more laws may be needed to grant or
preserve freedom than to maintain tyranny. In Russia, federal legislation has traditionally
been written in very general terms granting jurisdiction to a Ministry or other agency to
regulate a sector of the social or economic order. Laws are relatively brief by Western
standards and rarely delegate specific powers to administrative agencies or lower levels
of government in explicit terms. Even rarer are limitations on the exercise of power or
mechanisms for redressing errors or complaints.
With respect to health, legislation typically states that a particular subject area,
such as medical care, shall be the responsibility of the federal government (and lower
levels of government) and that the relevant Ministry, such as the MinZdrav, carries out
that responsibility and protects the rights of citizens.45 Even where oblast and municipal
health departments are expected to carry out certain functions on behalf of the federal
Ministry, legislation rarely defines what those functions are, how they should be
administered, or how the department might be held accountable. Thus, for both legal and
practical reasons, a Ministry enjoys remarkably broad discretion to run programs as it
sees best or as the leadership dictates. Ministry orders fill in the details left unmentioned
in the legislation, sometimes including clinical protocols for medical therapies. The

8
governing legislation rarely expressly limits the scope or content of such orders, and there
is little recourse against orders thought to be burdensome, obsolete, or unwise.
This “broad-authorization/discretionary-implementation” approach to legislation
produces a legal structure that is remarkably simple to administer. It also discourages
innovation and criticism. Lower level government authorities are ordinarily reluctant to
respond creatively to problems or to initiate new ventures without direct authorization
from the federal Ministry. Health professionals are similarly reluctant to change their
practices without receiving prior government authorization.
Several of the 1990’s proposed reforms sought to decentralize the ownership or
management of health care facilities, redistribute financial obligations, and grant both
health professionals and patients more freedom. Russia’s traditional format for
legislation is not well suited to these goals. New legislation in a more specific format
was needed, both to create new institutions and to coordinate their relationships. First,
change itself must be authorized—new forms of ownership, responsibility, financing, and
accountability; power to make contracts, freedom to use new forms of treatment, and new
mechanisms to enforce patient rights.46 Then, if the reforms are to meet the larger goal of
serving the entire population, the new mix must be regulated to ensure an equitable
distribution of health services.
The reformed health care system envisioned for Russia, as elsewhere, is not a
single entity or market, but encompasses several different types of relationships: between
government and insurers, health care facilities, and providers; insurers and patients;
insurers and hospitals, clinics, physicians, and suppliers; physicians and hospitals; and
patients and physicians, hospitals and clinics.2 Each of these relationships can be
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structured in several ways, yet all must work together if they are to succeed. Thus, each
relationship may require several laws, where only a few sufficed for all in the past. To
introduce more freedom of action into the system, Russia was obliged to create new laws,
both authorizing that freedom and regulating it to serve the national goal of solidarity.
DISTRIBUTIONAL GOALS REQUIRE SPECIFIC LAWS TO ACHIEVE EQUITY

The greater the freedom given to health care providers and insurers, the more
specific and complex is the law needed to ensure universal access to resources and
services. Some Russian policy makers are considering introducing something like
internal markets in health care, in which some providers gain financial and managerial
independence from the state but remain obligated to provide everyone services covered
by the constitutional guarantee.47 Completely free markets could soon render health care
unaffordable to even larger numbers of Russians. Therefore, each piece of legislation
that frees providers from direct government control and supervision necessitates
additional provisions authorizing alternative mechanisms for making sure that the right
mix of services remain available to all patients.
Moreover, because each sector of the health care system should be able to operate
in several different ways, new regulatory law needs to take all possible mechanisms into
account. This produces complex, detailed legislation and regulations. In particular,
where it is important to restrain the exercise of discretion (for example, to prevent abuses
like political favoritism), more specific rules are needed to delineate not only what is
permissible, but also the procedures for fair decision making. Indeed, democratic states
committed to social solidarity tend to experience the paradox of decentralization in which
the complexity of the law increases directly with extent of individual freedom.
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THE RULE OF LAW

Of course, no matter how well constructed new laws may be, they cannot enforce
themselves. And laws are not likely to be enforced in the absence of a genuine social
commitment to the rule of law. In Russia, the rule of law has gained only a tenuous
hold.16 For much of its history, Russia’s law was used as window dressing for
authoritarian regimes.48,49 Often-exemplary legal texts were meaningless in practice.
The Soviet government, for example, ignored guarantees of human rights in the Soviet
constitutions. Actual law enforcement was often selective.
It should not be surprising that Russians have little confidence that enacting a law
will protect them from arbitrary actions.50 Yet that is what the rule of law requires—faith
in the continued, impartial application of publicly known laws in a civil society.51 Health
care reforms are not likely to succeed if, for example, providers and insurers cannot rely
on the enforceability of the contracts they make. Hospitals are not likely to change their
treatment modalities unless they believe that their continued operation and financing
remain secure from arbitrary government intervention. Patients are not likely to seek care
if they cannot rely on legal protection of their confidentiality. Thus, the rule of law may
be the most important prerequisite to effective health care reform in Russia.
Belief in the rule of law ordinarily takes years, even generations, to develop.
Nevertheless, and in spite of their history, Russians retain a surprising faith in law as both
a catalyst and a tool for reform, perhaps because change has often come in the name of
the law, perhaps because they have few alternatives. The need for sound law is
especially acute in an era of economic turmoil. If social solidarity is not to unravel
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further, Russia will need the power of law to knit health care together into a more
effective system for everyone.

CATEGORIES OF REFORM MEASURES IN RUSSIA
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recognized
the potential for law reform to further health system reform in Russia. The Boston
University Project on Legal and Regulatory Health Care Reform in the Russian
Federation (BU Project) has provided legal technical assistance in drafting legislation and
regulations to Russian federal and oblast government entities since late 1995 with USAID
funding under a series of cooperative agreements.52 The BU Project has offered technical
assistance in legislative drafting for laws in four subject categories: (1) system structure,
(2) financing, (3) providers, and (4) infectious disease. A few examples from the BU
Project’s experience, described below, illustrate the law’s potential to advance health
reform and its limits in achieving effective change.
SYSTEM STRUCTURE

The importance of additional legislation to reforming the health system can be
seen in efforts of the lower house of parliament (the Duma) since 1995 to develop new
federal law on the structure of the health system. Duma Members (Deputies) assumed
that health reform could not progress without creating a new legal structure for the entire
system. Consistent with past practice, their initial goal was to lay out legal responsibility
for all elements of a health system in a new comprehensive federal statute. This General
Structure Law would cover medical facilities, health professionals, quality of care,
entitlement to care, insurance and financing, public health and prevention programs,
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sanitation, and environmental protection. To Western idealists frustrated with multiple,
incomplete and conflicting laws scattered in many volumes of code, this would be a
dream come true. To skeptics, it was an impossible dream.
In order to draft legislation describing the General Structure, the Deputies
confronted difficult questions about how each component of the health care system
should function and what was required to make that happen. Decentralizing the system
to give more flexibility to lower level government entities and medical facilities required
deciding how much legal authority oblast and municipal governments should have over
their local facilities, the services they provided, and the payments they received. These
decisions depended upon whether some or all government facilities should be given
budgetary, administrative, managerial or other forms of independence within a
government-owned system or turned over to private (commercial or nonprofit)
ownership. These options in turn gave rise to questions about whether and how to
preserve the citizens’ right to health care when providers had more freedom to determine
what services they would provide. Each question could be answered in several plausible
ways, and each answer affected how other components of the health care system should
be structured.
Writing the General Structure Law served as an exercise in policy development as
well as legislative drafting. The Duma had relatively limited experience in producing its
own vision of law independent of the Kremlin because its constitutional powers are
constrained by the President’s authority.47 Yet it was the Deputies, especially the recent
chairs of the Health Care Committee, who, alarmed by the deteriorating health conditions
in Russia, pushed for reform. The General Structure Law provided the focus for
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conceptualizing alternative approaches to achieving the goals of health reform. The BU
Project provided examples of legislation from different countries and supported meetings
with experts from different countries to discuss their experience with different
approaches to specific problems. Not surprisingly, the more the Deputies debated, the
more detailed the legislation became. Soon, it included something for everyone to dislike
and could not attract enough votes for passage.
The exercise was not in vain, however. The Deputies recognized that the
traditional “broad-authorization” approach to legislation could not easily capture their
vision of reform. They benefited from analyzing reform options, and they wanted and
needed to get more specific to solve the problems of health care. The result is a twopronged approach to drafting legislation. Where agreement can be reached on a
component of reform, the Deputies propose separate, more detailed, subject-specific
legislation for that component. Although this means that Russia—like everyone else—is
not likely to have a perfectly integrated health code, it allows the Duma to analyze its
reform options in a thoughtful, deliberative process. At the same time, work continues
sporadically on a General Structure Law of more limited scope—more descriptive than
prescriptive—consistent with the tradition of comprehensive statements of legal
responsibility. This may serve as a symbol of reform and a unifying framework for
separate pieces of future legislation.
Among the subject-specific statutes drafted is a Medical Devices Law authorizing
the federal government to approve and regulate medical devices for distribution in
Russia.53 The growth of needed medical device imports calls for sensible national
regulation, and the draft law is a welcome response. However, the current draft contains
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an awkward division of responsibilities among several ministries that may hamper its
passage and, if passed, its administration. It lies dormant in the Duma, perhaps because
interests profiting from the existing chaos (and a lack of clarity concerning the effect of
US and European Union equipment certification) do not support an imperfect
clarification of rights and governmental responsibilities.
In the late 1990’s, as economic and political turmoil increased, the Duma’s reform
efforts slowed. The MinZdrav may have favored continued federal control of the system,
but its budget was too small to influence oblast and municipal programs. In this climate,
several oblast governments took the initiative to develop their own reforms, which may
serve as models for other oblasts. For example, Novgorod Oblast enacted a
pharmaceutical law authorizing the oblast to create its own drug formulary and to
purchase drugs using competitive bidding.54 No such powers were necessary when the
state produced and provided all drugs—usually only one or two in each therapeutic
class—and controlled price and supply. Recently, however, the high cost of buying
pharmaceuticals from private companies, including a proliferation of imported patented
drugs, prompted the oblast to find new ways to limit drug expenditures. Its first impulse
was to limit the drugs available under the national guarantee by creating a formulary.
When the oblast recognized that it could not completely control external market prices, it
added competitive bidding for government purchases. Finally, it added a “generic
substitution” provision, enabling pharmacies to substitute cheaper generic drugs for
expensive patented products. The new law is helping the oblast use its scarce funds more
efficiently.
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FINANCING

Russian policy makers recognized that the constitutional guarantee of medical
care could not be realized without finding additional financial resources.55 The financial
pressure was exacerbated by an oversupply of hospital facilities and beds, a legacy of the
Soviet practice of lengthy in-patient care for most medical conditions. The best option
for decreasing costs was to reduce inpatient facilities and improve the efficiency of care,
including changing medical practice to encourage general practice, outpatient treatment
and shorter inpatient stays. However, hospital administrators, whose budgets increased
with the number or beds and volume of care actually provided, had little incentive to
reduce their own services. Moreover, the MinZdrav and many lawmakers did not believe
that Russia had excess capacity.
The first major health reform initiative in Russia was a step toward converting the
Soviet state-run health care structure into an insurance-based system. The Law of
Medical Insurance of Citizens of the Russian Federation (first enacted as a law of the
Soviet Union in 1991) provided a limited additional source of health financing. Known
as the Mandatory Health Insurance (MHI) law, it assessed a targeted payroll tax on
employers.56 Municipal governments were expected to pay the MHI fees for the nonworking population (elderly, unemployed, children), but many have not done so.
Economic decline and the under-reporting of income also limit the yield of the current
MHI assessment to about 0.75% of GDP. Moreover, the 1993 constitution’s guarantee of
free care to all Russian citizens has been interpreted to preclude employee contributions
to MHI funds or an assessment on the employee for coverage of dependents.
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Although supporters hoped the MHI law would unleash quasi-market forces to
reform Russian health financing, it has produced little change in the size, structure or
management of Russian health care institutions. In part, this is because MHI payments
are still only a tiny portion of total health facility funding. Line-item government budgets
continue to provide the largest portion of total revenues for most institutions.
Although the MHI law was amended in 1993 (partly to activate it), it fails to
clarify the insurance functions that its national regulatory body, the federal MHI Fund,
should exercise. Perhaps as a result, the Fund has been reluctant to take affirmative steps
to improve medical care by paying only for effective services. The regional insurance
funds that administer the MHI throughout the country are similarly reluctant. Some of
this resistance may be ascribed to old habits that die hard, especially where those who
administer the regional funds are the same people who worked in Soviet programs.57
Still, the absence of statutory provisions authorizing specific insurance powers
undoubtedly discourages the innovation that insurance was intended to introduce.
For-profit insurance companies are allowed to compete to obtain the MHI
"accounts" of employers. These "insurers" generally act as passive intermediaries,
disbursing available MHI funds to all qualified institutions using reimbursement
schemes approved by government authorities. The "insurer" takes no risk and is only
paid an administrative fee. Insurance companies working under the MHI law do not
develop selective networks or managed care programs. 58 However, the insurers sign
contracts with providers, which could become the basis for new reimbursement
methodologies or greater insurer activism in the future. Claims processing by the
insurers generates utilization data that were not previously available. Insurers often
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justify their continued role in the health care system by pointing to actions taken to
protect the insureds—recoveries obtained from providers who have injured patients
through poor medical practice.
Before the Russian "financial" bubble burst in the 1998 crash, some insurance
companies profited from the "float" in MHI payments. They invested receipts in high
yielding investments and delayed payments to providers. Patients as well as providers
express discontent with the MHI system. Because it is the one visible innovation in
Russian health financing in the 1990's, MHI is often blamed for inadequate funding of
the overextended health system inherited from the Soviets and for the decline in health
outcomes of the post Soviet years. There have been a number of calls in the Federal
Duma for the repeal of MHI, but none have yet succeeded.
Although the MHI law, as currently written, has not reformed the system, the
need for a national law to reform health care financing remains. Solving problems of
inadequate financing and oversupply of facilities and services in Russia will require more
than merely encouraging consumers or providers to change their behavior. It will require
new law.
In the meantime, the MinZdrav retains the power to institute some reforms
without new laws by issuing orders under its broad existing authority. The MinZdrav
recently developed two sets of guidelines with the potential for reducing costs and
improving efficiency. One set of planning guidelines sets targets for modest reductions
in bed capacity and usage, consistent with a 1997-1998 ministry policy statement. The
other provides guidelines for payments to federal tertiary care facilities. Both guidelines
essentially articulate the conditions for continued government operation of existing
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government health care facilities. They demonstrate what the federal government can do
if it is inclined to initiate reform. Few oblasts are willing to take similar official reforms
without federal approval.
At the same time, the federal government has been generally unwilling to relax its
control over financing government facilities. Moscow Oblast wanted to allow
overbedded hospitals to lease out their excess capacity and use the lease revenues to
improve their medical services. Under existing law, a hospital must send any such lease
revenues to the central funds of the hospital’s oblast government. To avoid this result, in
a rare example of creative lawyering, Moscow Oblast sought to appropriate—from its
own government revenues—the amount of the hospital’s lease revenues back to the
hospital. However, the federal Finance Ministry then issued new, strict guidelines on
leasing, reiterating that all revenues from the lease of excess capacity in government
facilities be returned to the government as owner of the facility. This precludes the oblast
from conducting its reform experiment, so that hospitals are unlikely to attempt to lease
excess capacity or will do so only in a clandestine manner. The federal reaction may
reflect fears that entrepreneurial activities will take money out of the health care system
that is intended to serve everyone.
PROVIDERS

Russian physicians and other health professionals have been government
employees working in federal, oblast, regional or city hospitals, polyclinics
(multispecialty clinics that serve as the primary health centers for most Russians), and
specialized clinics (for narcotic addiction, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and other infectious diseases, and groups at risk, such as miners). Under the
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centralized Soviet system, the Ministry of Education controlled the supply of physicians
through medical school admissions. Oblast and municipal health departments, operating
under national standards established by the MinZdrav, hired physicians, determined what
kind of work they would perform, where they worked, and how much they were paid.14
The Ministry also set standards for the volume of services it expected physicians to
perform. In this system, private practice did not officially exist.59
The Russian Federation generally continued this system, although health
departments were not always able to meet their payrolls for physicians (or anyone else).
One way to bring more money into the system and, ideally, improve the quality of
medical practice was to allow physicians to practice outside government facilities and
compete for fee-paying patients. Patients were already making under-the-table payments
to physicians, polyclinics, and hospitals to obtain care and supplies for treatment and
hospitalization. A Boston University sponsored household survey in January 1998 found
that an average of 14% of Russians’ monthly household expenditures were for medical
services and drugs (including over-the-counter drugs).60,61 This percentage included
1.5% for outpatient care and 2.6% for inpatient care, most of which occurred in
government hospitals and clinics. The survey estimated that these out-of-pocket
payments constituted 43% to 55% of total Russian health expenditures. If these
payments could be rechannelled into the national financing scheme for redistribution in
more efficient ways, total public and private funds available for financing medical care
could equal between 6.43% to 8.13% of GDP instead of the official government estimate
of 3.49% of GDP, and allow the government to fund needed services.
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Some physicians have been eager to begin a private practice independent of
government employment, seeking freedom from outdated and unscientific government
treatment protocols as well as increased income. Although some physicians in fact
offered services privately, few were willing to open a practice without the official
approval conferred by legislation. At first, federal legislators resisted the idea of
privatizing medical practice, fearing it would unravel the national health system. As
several scholars have noted, although market competition can theoretically achieve an
efficient distribution of consumer goods and services, it may not, without constraints,
necessarily achieve equity in the distribution of health care.2,62 Moreover, health care
systems rarely display the characteristics of the economist’s ideal free market.63, 64
Only when convinced that suitable law could protect constitutionally guaranteed services
from erosion by private practice did members of the Duma begin drafting legislation
authorizing the private practice of medicine.
When more pressing national matters cut the Duma’s effort short, several oblasts
considered similar measures. In February 2000, Samara became the first oblast to enact a
law formally structuring the private practice of medicine.65 A significant minority of
physicians in Samara began to formally offer services in private offices. Many exhibited
relief at being able to practice in the open under a law that promises to protect their
practices as legitimate and to treat them equally with government physicians.
Allowing private medical practice raised policy issues that did not exist when
physicians were government employees. A major concern was whether to permit private
practitioners to provide services that are part of the constitutional guarantee. On one
hand, if private practitioners offered more efficient and higher quality care, they could
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encourage productive competition with government facilities and ultimately improve care
for everyone. On the other hand, it was generally agreed that patients should not have to
pay for constitutionally guaranteed services. Of course, it was possible to allow private
practitioners to provide guaranteed services if the physicians were bound by contract to
accept the MHI Fund standard payment and not to charge patients any additional out-ofpocket fee. However, the idea that government or an MHI Fund could create binding
contracts with private physicians to carry out the constitutional guarantee was sufficiently
unusual in the health arena that it required specific statutory provisions not typical of
traditional Russian legislation, as well as more detailed contract models.
Private practice in Samara raised even more basic questions. Without government
screening conducted as part of its hiring practices, should there be restrictions on who
would be entitled to practice medicine? Samara wanted to limit medical practice to
qualified physicians and thus found it necessary to create a new legal system for licensing
physicians. Some private practitioners feared that a licensing agency dominated by the
more numerous government-employed physicians might restrict private practitioners
ability to obtain or maintain a license. Samara decided that it should no longer rely on
the discretion traditionally accorded government agencies and developed regulations for
the composition, powers, and operation of a medical licensure commission, as well as
qualifications for physician licensure, grounds for discipline and license termination, and
procedures for decision making. The level of detail is less than in United States licensure
laws and regulations, but strikingly more than most Russian laws. The Samara law may
well serve as a model for the national private medical practice law that the Duma hopes
to pass in the future.
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Novgorod oblast addressed the difficult issue of what services it would pay for as
part of the constitutional guarantee of free care. The Novgorod Oblast law on
Guaranteed Free Health Services makes free care a function of available resources and
allows private providers to compete with government facilities to provide such services.66
Kaluga Oblast proposed a similar law to create a minimum benefit package. Hospitals
and physicians could be penalized for charging patients for services that are guaranteed
as free care. The law also would permit the government to charge co-payments to
patients when government funding falls below certain levels. However, the constitutional
free care guarantee was believed to preclude charging patients a co-payment at the point
of service, so the constitutionality of this provision remains in question.
The vast network of government controlled hospitals and health facilities put an
enormous strain on Russia’s national health care budget and bound practitioners to often
out-moded treatment methods. Closing hospitals or converting beds to other uses could
reduce costs and encourage more effective care. But, as government entities, the
hospitals do not have the freedom or authority to make such changes unilaterally. There
has been discussion of reorganizing hospitals into non-profit organizations or trusts to
allow them the financial and managerial flexibility to operate more efficiently, thereby
reducing local, and ultimately national, costs. This approach holds particular promise
because cost savings would remain within the health system to be used for improving the
quality of care, rather than, as in the United States, being transferred as profits to private
investors in commercial for-profit corporations. However, such organizational
restructuring requires new law authorizing the non-profit entity. Until recently, proposals
for such a law have been kept off the federal legislature’s agenda because they might be
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misconstrued as “back-door privatization” or commercialization of the hospitals.
However, the Putin administration is currently drafting a new law to permit a more
independent form of organization for certain federal, oblast and municipal government
institutions, such as cultural, educational and health facilities.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND DISEASE PREVENTION

Health reform has not been limited to financing and delivery. Lawmakers have
struggled to restructure their public health services to slow the spread of infectious
diseases. The major Russian laws on this subject look more like Western European laws,
perhaps because they are more targeted than laws on restructuring the financing or
delivery of health care, or because they concern basic health problems that are less
culturally bound than political or medical institutions.
For example, Russia’s federal law on the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS,
enacted in 1995, prescribes a reasonably enlightened regime for prevention education,
free treatment for people with HIV/AIDS, and protection of the rights of people with
HIV/AIDS.67 However, prevention programs have never received the promised funding,
so government has been unable to provide the type of public education that has reduced
HIV transmission in other countries. Hospitals may even contribute to the spread of
infection by failing to take universal precautions, possibly for lack of supplies, training or
awareness of the growing epidemic.
Instead, HIV policy in practice has focused on testing patients for HIV infection,
even though there are few drugs available for treatment and testing serves little purpose.
Some of the emphasis on testing may be due to the law’s failure to specify priorities
among the comprehensive list of measures for which the federal government is
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responsible. Some may arise from ingrained habits from the Soviet era when people with
infectious diseases were routinely identified and isolated in specialty hospitals. Indeed,
there have been reports of local officials seeking the names of AIDS patients even though
the federal law requires physicians to keep that information confidential. In the absence
of adequate treatment, testing may appear to be all that government can afford to do,
although prevention education may be both less expensive and more effective in
preventing transmission. The considerable promise of the federal HIV/AIDS law has not
yet been realized.
The federal Parliament also passed a federal Tuberculosis Control bill to ensure
treatment for the rapidly growing population with TB.68 President Putin, however,
declined to sign the bill into law, claiming that it contradicts existing laws on federal
responsibilities. The administration’s objection may lie in the bill’s reliance on
physicians, rather than national ministry protocols, to decide whether to hospitalize
patients. The bill expressly protects patients from discrimination. Legislators
unenthusiastically agreed to authorize involuntary treatment for recalcitrant patients who
could or would not complete treatment (to prevent drug resistance as well as to ensure
cure). Russia’s experience with involuntary “hospitalization” of political dissidents
undoubtedly made lawmakers reluctant to use involuntary hospitalization for genuine
treatment, but they were eager to learn how other countries used due process procedures
to protect patients from unjustified confinement and incorporated a few due process
elements, including judicial review of involuntary hospitalization, into the bill.
If the Tuberculosis Control bill were enacted, it would still face practical
obstacles. The federal government has not been able to provide sufficient funding for
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appropriate drug therapy in the past and may not be able to do so in the near future. In
addition, like the HIV law, the Tuberculosis Control bill calls for changes in ingrained
medical practices. Although the law makes clear that patients are to be treated
(voluntarily) primarily on an outpatient basis, providers still tend to routinely hospitalize
TB patients as in the past, and many continue to use outdated therapies. It will take more
than the law to change medical practice.

CONCLUSIONS
Health reform in Russia is unlikely without law reform. Law reform is a
prerequisite to Russian health reform because few relevant changes can be made without
changing the law. Russian health care has not been released from government control
except by new laws authorizing specific actions. As more freedom is introduced into the
health care system, new laws are needed to ensure the equitable distribution of services;
and the more things change, the more complex the law becomes.
At the same time, new laws are not sufficient to produce real reform. Law reform
only works where the rule of law is respected. In the past decade, policy makers have
been working to introduce health reforms laws in an era in which the rule of law is under
enormous strain and openly flouted in many sectors of the economy. Russia also faces
severe financial constraints on carrying out even the best-constructed laws. Moreover,
many people are uncomfortable with proposed changes and some actively resist.
President Putin has indicated little enthusiasm for reforms that diminish federal control
over health care funding or personnel.
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Nonetheless, there are brighter prospects for the rule of law in the health care
system than in other sectors of Russian’s economy. Most health care providers and
policy makers remain committed to both improving the system and making it serve
everyone, and they recognize that law is necessary for achieving both goals. Progress
may be inching forward. Legislators who decried any private activity in health care only
a few years ago have argued more recently in favor of such reforms. The Putin
administration has expressed interest in recommendations for future health reform,
including alternative organizational forms, like hospital trusts, and using private
payments to reduce the costs of guaranteed health care for the poor.
First on Russia’s health reform agenda is preservation of the constitutional
guarantee of free medical care for all. While economic and financial reforms are
recommended to make the best use of scarce resources, they are not supposed to operate
to exclude Russians from care. Thus, law has played a central role in determining what
reforms have been produced and whether additional reforms are likely to materialize in
the future.
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